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The Banjul Charter and the African
Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation
of the Language of Duties
MAKAU WA MUTUA*
I. INTRODUCrION
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Afri-
can Charter),' the basis of Africa's continental human rights sys-
tem, entered into force on October 21, 1986, upon ratification by a
simple majority of member states of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU).2 The African Charter has attracted criticism
because it departs from the narrow formulations of other regional
and international human rights instruments.3 In particular, it codi-
* Projects Director, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School. University of Dar-
es-Salaam, L.LB. 1983, L.L.M. 1984; Harvard Law School, LLM. 1985, S.JD. 1987. The
author wishes to thank Athena Mutua, Hope Lewis, John Witte, Jr., Henry J. Steiner,
David Kennedy, Henry Richardson, and Joe Oloka-Onyango for their insightful comments
and suggestions. The author wishes to devote this Article to his three sons: Lumumba,
Amani, and Mwalimu, whose duty it is to continue the search for a coherent, just, and
defensible African cultural identity.
1. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 LL.M. 59 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter).
2. The African Charter, also referred to as the Banjul Charter, was adopted in 1981 by
the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), the official body of African states. It is known as the Banjul Charter
because the final draft was produced in Banjul, the capital of the Gambia. The Charter's
sole implementing organ, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
African Commission), was established in 1987. The African Commission's eleven
members, known as commissioners, are elected by the OAU by secret ballot for a six-year
term and serve in their own personal capacities. See African Charter, supra note 1, arts.
31, 33, 36, 45, 21 I.L.M. at 64-65.
3. The major human rights instruments include the trilogy of documents commonly
referred to as the International Bill of Rights: (i) the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(II), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; (ii) the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR,
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fies the three generations of rights, including the controversial con-
cept of peoples' rights, and imposes duties on individual members
of African societies.4  While a number of scholars have focused
attention on apparent tensions between human and peoples' rights,
there has been little discussion of the notion of individual duties in
the context of the African Charter. Yet a thorough understanding
of the meaning of human rights, and the complicated processes
through which they are protected and realized, would seem to link
inextricably the concepts of human rights, peoples' rights, and
duties of individuals. Individual rights cannot make sense in a
social and political vacuum, devoid of the duties assumed by indi-
what many call the Bible of the human rights movement; and (iii) the 1966 International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]. The last
two instruments entered into force in 1976.
Apart from the African Charter, the other major regional human rights instruments
include (i) the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer. LVIII.23 Rev.2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), the
document that anchors the inter-American human rights system; (ii) the [European]
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955); and (iii) the European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961,529 U.N.TS.
89 (1965), which forms the basis for the European human rights system. See generally
Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights (1988); Guide to International Human
Rights Practice (Hurst Hannum ed., 1992) [hereinafter Human Rights Practice Guide];
United Nations, 1 Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/1/Rev.4 (1993).
4. Civil and political rights, the staple of the human rights movement, have been
commonly referred to as "first generation" rights, while economic, cultural, and social
rights, are called "second generation" rights. In addition to these, the African Charter
provides for "peoples' rights," known also as collective or group rights, which include the
right of peoples to self-determination, political sovereignty over their natural resources,
and the right to development. Buergenthal, supra note 3, at 176-77. One group right, the
right to self-determination, is widely recognized and enshrined in article 1 common to both
the ICCPR and the ICESCR. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 3,
art. 1, para. 1. Chapter II of the African Charter, which imposes various duties on
individuals, is that document's most radical contribution to human rights law. See African
Charter, supra note 1, arts. 27-29, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
5. For detailed discussions and analyses of the relationships between peoples and human
rights in the African Charter, see generally Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 Va. J. Int'l L. 667 (1982); U. Oji
Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 902
(1983); Theo van Boven, The Relations Between Peoples' Rights and Human Rights in the
African Charter, 7 Hum. Rts. L.. 183 (1986); Jean-Bernard Marie, Relations Between
Peoples' Rights and Human Rights: Semantic and Methodological Distinctions, 7 Hum.
Rts. L.J. 195 (1986); Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A
Comparison and Appraisal, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 585 (1987); Richard Kiwanuka, The
Meaning of 'People' in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 82 Am. J. Int'l
L. 80 (1988).
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viduals.6 This appears to be more true of Africa than any other
place. The individualist, narrow formulation of human rights is not
sufficient to pull the African continent back from the abyss.7
The argument by current reformers that Africa merely needs a
liberal democratic, rule-of-law state to be freed from despotism is
mistaken. The transplantation of the narrow formulation of West-
ern liberalism cannot adequately respond to the historical reality
and the political and social needs of Africa. The sacralization of
the individual and the supremacy of the jurisprudence of individual
rights in organized political and social society is not a natural,
"transhistorical," or universal phenomenon, applicable to all socie-
ties, without regard to time and place. The ascendancy of the lan-
6. There seems little doubt that private duties, implied and direct, are contemplated by
most human rights instruments. Examples abound. Article 5 of the ICCPR provides, in
part, that nothing contained therein can imply "for any state, group or person" any right to
limit the rights of others. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 5. Moreover, individuals can be
punished for violations of human rights, as was the case in Nuremburg, given that the
Geneva Conventions impose duties on private individuals. See generally Jordan Paust,
The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.
51-63 (1992).
7. The human rights movement is based on the Western liberal tradition which
conceives of the individual as atomistic and alienated from society and the state. Although
Jack Donnelly makes a case for other trajectories within the liberal tradition, he concedes
that "[t]he 'Western' or 'liberal' conception of human rights is conventionally characterized
as resting on a social vision of largely isolated individuals holding (only) property rights
and 'negative' civil and political liberties." Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Western
Liberalism [hereinafter Donnelly, Human Rights and Western Uberalism], in Human
Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives 31,31 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M.
Deng eds., 1990) [hereinafter Cross-Cultural Perspectives]. This formulation, which this
author terms Eurocentric because it grows out of European history and philosophy, sees
the human rights corpus merely as an instrument for individual claims against the state.
Donnelly argues that this "conventional, or minimalist, conception of liberalism.... is only
one strand of the liberal tradition of political theory and practice." Id. at 32. In fact,
Donnelly posits that there is an "alternative strand that rests on a broader, more subtle-
and ... more coherent and defensible-social vision." Id. In this more radical liberal
tradition, Donnelly argues, "individualism is moderated by social values, private property
rights are limited rather than absolute, and civil and political rights are coupled with
economic and social rights." Id. at 33. It is this strand of liberalism that is the source of the
social democratic regimes and the welfare states of the Western industrial democracies.
Notwithstanding Donnelly's alternative insight, it is primarily the conventional strand of
liberalism that has dominated the theory and practice of the human rights movement.
Scholars and activists in the West, the main authors of the discourse, have articulated a
vision that places civil and political rights above other categories of rights. In effect, the
human rights movement has become an anti-catastrophe crusade, under the captive
leadership of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, to contain and control
state action against the individual. The practice of human rights by inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and national human
rights institutions has been primarily focused on civil and political rights. Economic, social,
and cultural rights, while part of the rhetoric of rights, remain severely underdeveloped.
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guage of individual rights has a specific historical context in the
Western world. The rise of the modem nation state in Europe and
its monopoly of violence and instruments of coercion gave birth to
a culture of rights to counterbalance the invasive and abusive
state.8 John Locke reduced this thinking to a philosophy in his Two
Treatises of Government.9 He argued that each individual, together
with his compatriots, contractually transfers to a public authority
his individual right to implement the law of nature.10 But this
power is conditional and limited to the state's duty to "protect indi-
vidual rights and freedoms from invasion and to secure their more
effective guarantee."'1 According to Locke, a government that sys-
tematically breaches these duties becomes illegitimate. While
Locke's conception is the floor-the modern state is more intru-
sive and pervasive than he imagined-it remains the basic justifica-
tion for the existence of the state in the West.
The development of the state in Africa is so radically different
from its European equivalent that the traditional liberal concep-
tion of the relationship between the state and the individual is of
limited utility in imagining a viable regime of human rights. The
modem African state was imposed on ethno-political communities
by European imperialists and did not result from the natural pro-
gression or evolution of those societies.12 Only a handful of mod-
em African states bear any territorial resemblance to the political
formations which existed prior to penetration and subjugation by
European states.' 3 The majority of states were contrived over-
night, often dismantling existing ethno-political communities and
8. See generally Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social
Order, 5 J. L. & Religion 65 (1987). Cover argues that the myth, the jurisprudence of
rights, is essential to counterbalance the omnipotent state. This myth "a) establishes the
State as legitimate only in so far as it can be derived from the autonomous creatures who
trade in their rights for security-i.e., one must tell a story about the States's utility or
service to us, and b) potentially justifies individual and communal resistance to the
Behemoth." Id. at 69. It is not surprising that Western individuals and movements employ
the language of rights in their claims against society or the state. Examples range from civil
rights groups to women's organizations and gay and lesbian individuals and groups.
9. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
10. Id.
11. Donnelly, Human Rights and Western Liberalism, supra note 7, at 34.
12. In 1885 at the Berlin Conference, European powers carved up the map of Africa and
created dozens of entirely new countries without regard to existing political entities, ethnic
boundaries, economic considerations, historical alliances, or geographic and demographic
variables. See Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in Africa in World Politics
19, 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 1991).
13. Only Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar,' Swaziland,
Lesotho, and Botswana have any meaningful pre-colonial territorial identities. Id.
[Vol. 35:339
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their organizational structures. Communities that lived indepen-
dently of each other were coerced to live together under the newly-
created colonial state. Most of these new citizens lacked any
instinctual or nationalistic bond to the colonial state. The failure of
the successor post-colonial state points to the continued inability of
the "unnatural" and forced state to inspire loyalty and distinct
national identities. 14 This disconnection, between the people and
the modem African state, is not merely a function of the loss of
independence or self-governance over pre-colonial political and
social structures and the radical imposition of new territorial
bounds with unfamiliar citizenry. It is above all a crisis of cultural
and philosophical identity: the delegitimation of values, notions,
and philosophies about the individual, society, politics, and nature
developed over centuries. Severe as these problems are, the crisis
of the African state is not insoluble. The purpose of this Article is
to imagine and reconfigure a rights regime that could achieve legit-
imacy in Africa, especially among the majority rural populace, and
become the basis for social and political reconstruction. The recon-
struction proposed here is not merely that of human rights norms.
In order for the proposal to make sense, a reconfiguration of the
African state must also be simultaneously attempted. The imposed
colonial state, and its successor, the post-colonial state, stand as
moral and legal nullities, entities whose salvation partially lies in
new map-making in the context of self-determination for Africa's
many nationalities, democratization, and, most importantly, histor-
ical reconnection with certain pre-colonial ideals. However, the
purpose of this Article is not to explore the creation of a new polit-
14. This author has argued elsewhere that "[slince citizens lack an instinctual and
nationalistic bond to the state, those who become rulers pillage it." Makau wa Mutua,
Redrawing the Map along African Lines, Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 1994, at 17 [hereinafter
Redrawing the Map]. Furthermore,
[flew Africans owe their allegiance to the emergent state; many identify with an
ethnic group-a loyalty that predates colonialism-or the pan-Africanist idea of
Africa as home. The colonial state and its successor have been so alienated from
the people that the development of national consciousness was not possible.
Id. Other writers have characterized the transformation of the African political and cul-
tural landscape in more modest terms. According to Crawford Young, "the depth and
intensity of alien penetration of subordinated societies continues to cast its shadow."
Young, supra note 12, at 19-20. He notes further that the
cultural and linguistic impact [of colonialism] was pervasive, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa. Embedded in the institutions of the new states was the deep
imprint of the mentalities and routines of their colonial predecessors. Overall,
colonial legacy cast its shadow over the emergent African state system to a degree
unique among the major world regions.
Id. at 19-20.
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ical map, but to reconstruct the human rights corpus. This choice
does not imply a hierarchy or ranking. In practice, both paradigms
must be simultaneously addressed for the formulation to bear fruit.
For the present purposes, the current human rights movement
must be understood as only a piece of the whole. Its roots in the
Western liberal tradition necessarily deny it completeness, though
not the universality of many of its ideals and norms. To paraphrase
the famous metaphor, the gourd is only partially filled by the West-
ern tradition: it falls on other traditions to fill it. On this premise,
this Article makes several interrelated arguments. Part II stresses
the African notions of human rights which existed prior to coloni-
zation and how those notions differed from the contemporary
Eurocentric articulation of human rights. In particular, these
notions saw the individual social being as the bearer of both rights
and duties. Accordingly, Part III asserts that the pre-colonial con-
cept of duty remains a valid means of conceptualizing human rights
and, thus, should be the basis for the construction of a regime of
unitary, integrated rights regime capable of achieving legitimacy in
Africa. Finally, Part IV of this Article presents a vision that strikes
a balance between duties and rights. Not only does this vision
restrain the runaway individualism of the West, but its also has
strong roots in the continent and indeed may be Africa's last hope
for reversing societal collapse. The present attempt is not meant to
deny the validity of the Western liberal tradition to the human
rights corpus, but only to inform it with an African contribution
that entwines duties and rights in a society consumed by the sociali-
zation of the individual, a concept articulated by the African
Charter.
The purpose of this Article is not to find parallel rights in Afri-
can conceptions of human rights in order to show the equality of
African cultures to European ones. Although that is one incidental
by-product, this Article did not set out to clothe these parallel
rights in the language of rights. In fact, the vindication of rights in
Africa had a very different dimension. In the West, the language of
rights primarily developed along the trajectory of claims against
the state; entitlements which imply the right to seek an individual
remedy for a wrong. The African language of duty, however, offers
a different meaning for individual/state-society relations: while
people had rights, they also bore duties. The resolution of a claim
was not necessarily directed at satisfying or remedying an individ-
ual wrong. It was an opportunity for society to contemplate the
complex web of individual and community duties and rights to seek
[Vol. 35:339
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a balance between the competing claims of the individual and
society.
This view is not relativist. It does not advance or advocate the
concept of apartheid in human rights or the notion that each cul-
tural tradition has generated its own distinctive and irreconcilable
concept of human rights. 15 It proceeds from the position that,
although cultural relativism in human rights as an anti-imperial
device is admirable, it is a misunderstanding inspired by cultural
nationalism. What its proponents see as radically distinctive, irrec-
oncilable traditions also possess ideals which are universal. Most
critiques of cultural relativism, on the other hand, are ethnocentric
and symptomatic of the moral imperialism of the West.16 Both
extremes only serve to detain the development of a universal juris-
prudence of human rights.17
In reality, the construction and definition of human rights norms
are dynamic and continuous processes. Human rights are not the
monopoly or the sole prerogative of any one culture or people,
although claims to that end are not in short supply.18 In one cul-
15. For more detailed views of the concept of cultural relativism in human rights, see
generally Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (1989)
[hereinafter Donnelly, Universal Human Rights]; Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of
Human Rights a Western Concept? 120 Diogenes 75 (1982); Adamantia Pollis & Peter
Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Applicability, in Human
Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds.,
1979) [hereinafter Human Rights Perspectives].
16. Rhoda Howard, a well known Canadian Africanist, refuses to acknowledge that pre-
colonial African societies knew human rights as a concept. She emphasizes that
"traditional Africa protected a system of obligations and privileges based on ascribed
statuses, not a system of human rights to which one was entitled merely by virtue of being
human." Rhoda Howard, Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on
Human Rights [hereinafter Howard, Group Versus Individual], in Cross-Cultural
Perspectives, supra note 7, at 159, 167. Howard is so fixated with the Western notion of
rights attaching only to the atomized individual that she summarily dismisses arguments by
African scholars, some of whom could be classified as cultural relativists, that individual
rights were held in a social, collective context.
17. Francis Deng disagrees with the view "widely held in the West and accepted or
exploited in developing countries, that the concept of human rights is peculiarly Western."
Francis M. Deng, A Cultural Approach to Human Rights Among the Dinka, in Cross-
Cultural Perspectives, supra note 7, at 261,261. "[To arrogate the concept," writes Deng,
"to only certain groups, cultures, or civilizations is to aggravate divisiveness on the issue, to
encourage defensiveness or unwarranted self-justification on the part of the excluded, and
to impede progress toward a universal consensus on human rights." Id.
18. Donnelly, for example, dismisses cultural relativists and then declares, rather hastily,
that "human rights are foreign to such communities [African, Native American, traditional
Islamic social systems], which employed other mechanisms to protect and realize human
dignity." Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 118. Unless the contrary is
established, this author assumes that all cultures have evolved moral and ethical standards
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ture, the individual may be venerated as the primary bearer of
rights; while, in another, individual rights may be more harmonized
with the corporate body. Rather than assert the primacy of one
over the other, or argue that only one cultural expression and his-
torical experience constitutes human rights, this author views each
experience as a contributor to the whole. The process of the con-
struction of universal human rights is analogous to the proverbial
description of the elephant by blind men: each, based on his sense
of feeling, offers a differing account. However, all the accounts
paint a complete picture when put together. As a dynamic process,
the creation of a valid conception of human rights must be univer-
sal. That is, the cultures and traditions of the world must, in effect,
compare notes, negotiate positions, and come to agreement over
what constitutes human rights. Even after agreement, the doors
must remain open for further inquiry, reformulation, or revision.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA:
CONTENT AND CoNTExT
This segment of the Article will explore the validity of both the
argument made often by Africans, and the controversy it engen-
ders, that the concept of human rights was not alien to pre-colonial
societies and that such notions were the foundation of social and
political society. Recent debates, which are primarily interpretive,
have focused attention on this divisive theme. They agree on basic
behavioral, political, and social characteristics but disagree as to
their meaning. 19 There are no easy answers for a number of rea-
sons. In particular, methodological pitfalls exist for any analysis
that attempts to address the length and width of sub-Saharan
Africa. The sheer size of the continent, and the diversity of Afri-
can peoples and their societies, defy easy categorization or general-
ization. Secondly, with regard to human rights, there are very few
extant sources of pre-colonial societies. The oral tradition common
as well as norms and processes that protect the dignity and worth of human beings in both
their individual and collective personalities. It is these norms and processes-which
manifest themselves in all cultures of the world-that germinate the concept of human
rights.
19. Timothy Fernyhough, Human Rights and Precolonial Africa, in Human Rights and
Governance in Africa 39, 39 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Human Rights
and Governance]. Fernyhough notes that this division is ironic because "both groups take
as their starting point a precolonial Africa that they agree was precapitalist and
predominantly agrarian, relatively decentralized politically, and characterized by
communal social relations." Id.
['Vol. 35:339
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to most of Africa had its own imprecision even before its interrup-
tion by the forces of colonialism.
Nevertheless, several broad themes are discernable from the
past. It is now generally accepted that the African pre-colonial
past was neither idyllic nor free of the abuses of power and author-
ity common to all human societies. However, the despotic and far-
reaching control of the individual by the omnipotent state, first
perfected in Europe, was unknown. 20 Instead, pre-colonial Africa
consisted of two categories of societies: those with centralized
authority, administrative machinery, and standing judicial institu-
tions, such as the Zulu and the Ashanti, and those with more com-
munal and less intrusive governmental paraphernalia, such as the
Akamba and Kikuyu of Kenya.21 But a feature common to almost
all pre-colonial African societies was their ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic homogeneity-a trait that gave them fundamental
cohesion. 2 -
Had these political societies developed the concept of human
rights? Proponents of the concept of human rights in pre-colonial
African societies are accused by their opponents of confusing
human dignity with human rights.2 This view holds that the "Afri-
20. Although the majority of pre-colonial authorities in Africa were not rigidly
stratified, a number of highly centralized states such Buganda and the Nigerian emirates
divided society into the repressive categories of nobles, freemen, and slaves. See Rhoda
Howard, Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: Some Problems of Implicit Comparisons, 6
Hum. Rts. Q. 160, 175-76 (1984) [hereinafter Howard, Evaluating Human Rights).
Howard errs, however, when she asserts that the "picture of precolonial African social
relations on which the communal model is based is inaccurate even regarding the past."
Id. at 175. She deliberately fails to admit that highly centralized societies were the
exception, not the norm; most were governed by ideals of communitarianism.
21. An examination of pre-colonial societies yields two basic models. A majority of
societies, many of which were agricultural, pastoralist or both, were relatively free of rigid
social stratification, although age and gender played significant roles in determining both
social and political status. A number of others had developed coercive state structures.
See generally Eric 0. Ayisi, An Introduction to the Study of African Culture (1979); Myer
Fortes & Edward Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (1940).
22. A basic contradiction between the European nation-state and pre-colonial Africa
societies lies in the constitution of political society. In distinguishing what he calls "African
cultural-nations" from the modern state, Mojekwu argues that
[w]hile the European impersonal governments were able to accommodate and
control peoples from several ethnic, racial, and cultural origins within the nation-
state, African cultural-nations controlled kinship groups within their cultural
boundaries. A cultural-nation governed through familial chiefs and elders who
shared authority with the community at large.
Chris Mojekwu, International Human Rights: An African Perspective, in International
Human Rights: Contemporary Issues 85, 87 (Jack L Nelson & Vera M. Green eds., 1980).
Few pre-colonial African societies were multi-ethnic.
23. Howard, Group Versus Individual, supra note 16, at 165.
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can concept of justice," unlike human rights, "is rooted not in indi-
vidual claims against the state, but in the physical and psychic
security of group membership." 24 While it is probably correct to
argue that African societies did not emphasize individual rights in
the same way that European societies did, it is not a correct pre-
sumption to claim that they did not know the conception of indi-
vidual rights at all.
According to Ronald Cohen, a right is an entitlement:
At its most basic level, a human right is a safeguarded
prerogative granted because a person is alive. This means
that any human being granted personhood has rights by
virtue of species membership. And a right is a claim to
something (by the right-holder) that can be exercised and
enforced under a set of grounds or justifications without
interference from others. The subject of the right can be
an individual or a group and the object is that which is
being laid claim to as a right.25
Moreover, a brief examination of the norms governing legal, polit-
ical, and social structures in pre-colonial societies demonstrates
that the concept of rights, like that articulated by Cohen, informed
the notion of justice and supported a measure of individualism.
Two societies which are representative of the two basic organiza-
tional paradigms prevalent in pre-colonial Africa illustrate the
point. The Akamba of east Africa were symptomatic of the less
rigidly organized societies, whereas the Akans of west Africa were
characteristic of the more centralized state systems. In Akan
thought, the individual had both descriptive and normative charac-
teristics.26 Both endowed the person with individual rights as well
24. Id. at 166. Howard sees no middle ground between individual and group
consciousness. She writes, incredibly, that for Africans to "assert their human rights as
individuals would be unthinkable and would undercut their dignity as group members."
Id.
25. Ronald Cohen, Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study of Human Rights in
Africa, in Human Rights and Governance, supra note 19, at 3,4. Wiredu defines a right as
a "claim that people are entitled to make on others or on society at large by virtue of their
status." Kwasi Wiredu, An Akan Perspective on Human Rights, in Cross-Cultural
Perspectives, supra note 7, at 243, 243.
26. Wiredu, supra note 25, at 243. Akans believed that each individual had intrinsic
value and was entitled to a measure of basic respect. But individuals were also members of
matrilineal kinship lineages which generated duties and obligations. A person could
enhance his or her "individuality" or "personhood" by executing duties such as
participating in public works and sustaining a prosperous household. Conversely, if one
failed to make these contributions, their personhood diminished. This "normative layer"
in the conception of an individual bears obligations, but it is also "matched by a whole
[Vol. 35:339
AFRICAN CULTURAL FINGERPRINT
as obligations. Similarly, the Akamba believed that "all members
were born equal and were supposed to be treated as such beyond
sex and age."2 7 The belief prevailed in both societies that, as an
inherently valuable being, the individual was naturally endowed
with certain basic rights.
Akan political society was organized according to the principle
of kinships. A lineage of those who were descended from the same
ancestress formed the basic political unit. Adults in each lineage
elected an elder. All lineage heads, in turn, formed the town coun-
cil which was chaired by a chief who, though chosen according to
descent, was in part elected.28 The chief, however, could not rule
by fiat, because decisions of the council were taken by consensus.
Moreover, council decisions could be criticized publicly by constit-
uents who found them unacceptable. As Wiredu explains, there
was no "doubt about the right of the people, including the elders,
to dismiss a chief who tried to be oppressive."2 9
Among the Akamba, individuals joined the elders council, the
most senior rank in Akamba society, after demonstrating commit-
ment to the community and responsibility in personal matters.
Maintaining a stable household, which included a spouse or
spouses and children, was a necessary precondition. The council
was a public forum which made decisions by consensus. Although
series of rights that accrue to the individual simply because he lives in a society in which
everyone has those obligations." Id. at 247.
27. Joseph Muthiani, Akamba From Within 84 (1973). while all "people were
considered equal in status as human beings" everyone was expected to show strangers
,"special generosity." Id. at 18. The age-gradation on which the Akamba were organized
was a functional structure based on the level of physical maturity. Equality and democracy
were required within each age grade. Women had their own comparable but separate
prestige structure which, however, was rarely consulted by the council of elders in matters
of public concern. Id. at 80-82.
28. 'Wiredu, supra note 25, at 248-49. On occasion, an election was necessary to
determine who in the royal lineage was the rightful heir. The town was the basic unit of
government among the Akans. Several Akan towns could group together to form larger
governmental units.
29. Id. at 251 ("The stool was the symbol of chiefly status, and so the installation of a
chief was called enstoolment and his dismissal destoolment."). The "destooing" of a chief
was governed by certain processes and rules. Charges would be filed and investigations
conducted before a decision could be reached. Id. On rules governing a chieftainship, see
Ayisi, supra note 21, at 48. Further evidence of democratic governance in traditional
African society is offered by Kobia's description of the political organization among the
Meru of Kenya. Members of the njuri ndzeke, the supreme council of elders, were "very
carefully elected and had to be individuals of unquestionable integrity and in good
standing with the society." Samuel Kobia, The Quest for Democracy in Africa 12 (1993).
The chair of the njuri ncheke, which held legislative and judicial powers, "rotated among
the agwe," leaders of the six sub-groups of the Meru nation. Id.
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the Akamba resented any social organization with a central author-
ity, the council's services included the legislation of public norms
and customs.3 0 These two examples demonstrate that individuals
in pre-colonial society had a right to political participation in deter-
mining by whom and through what policies to be ruled.
Much of the discussion about whether pre-colonial societies
knew of and enforced individual human rights has taken place in
the absence of considered studies of, and reference to, judicial
processes in those societies. A preliminary examination of both
the Akan and Akamba societies strongly indicates individual-con-
scious systems of justice. With respect to the Akamba, a party to a
complaint appeared before the council of elders in the company of
his jury, a selection of individuals who enjoyed the party's confi-
dence. Unlike Western-style jurors, the Akamba did not hand
down a verdict, but advised the party on how to plead and what
arguments to put forth to win the case. They had to be steeped in
Kamba law, customs, and traditions. The threat of the administra-
tion of kithitu, the Kamba oath, which was believed to bring harm
to those who lied, encouraged truthfulness. 31 After presentations
by parties, the elders would render judgement or give counsel on
the appropriate settlement. Each offense carried a punishment:
murder was compensated by the payment of over ten head of cat-
tle; rapists were charged goats; assaults, depending on their seri-
ousness, could cost over ten head of cattle; adultery was punishable
by the payment of at least a goat and bull; and an arsonist was
required to build his victim a new house or replace the lost prop-
erty. Individual rights to cultivated land were also recognized and
protected.32 These elaborate punishments present just one indica-
tion of the seriousness with which Kamba society took individual
rights to personal security, property, marriage, and the dignity and
integrity of the family.
In Akan society, the principle of innocent-until-proven-guilty
was deeply embedded in social consciousness. According to
Wiredu, "it was an absolute principle of Akan justice that no
30. Muthiani, supra note 27, at 83.
31. Id. at 85; see also Charles W. Hobley, Ethnology of the A-Kamba and Other East
African Tribes 78 (1971).
32. Hobley, supra note 31, at 78-79. Cattle were highly valued as a measurement of
wealth. Among the Maasai, another east African people, the murder of a man was
compensated by the fixed fine of forty-nine head of cattle. It is interesting to note that no
fine was set for the murder of women because the Maasai almost never murdered women,
due to the belief that ill-luck would strike the murderer. See S.S. Ole Sankan, The Maasai
14 (1971).
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human being could be punished without trial. '3 3 The Akans, like
the Akamba, also recognized a wide range of individual rights:
murder, assault, and theft were punished as violations of the
person.34
For those who deny the recognition of human rights in pre-colo-
nial societies, it must come as a strange irony that the human rights
corpus shares with pre-colonial Africa the importance of personal
security rights. The right to life, for example, was so valued that
the power over life and death was reserved for a few elders and
was exercised "only after elaborate judicial procedure, with
appeals from one court to another, and often only in cases of mur-
der and manslaughter. ' 35 This respect for human life was not an
aberration. Fernyhough notes that much of Africa is characterized
by a "preoccupation with law, customary and written, and with
legal procedure. '36 He adds that the Amhara of Ethiopia, for
example, have historically relished litigation and the lengthy cross-
examination of witnesses. Whether a society was highly centralized
or not, "there existed elaborate rules of procedure intended to pro-
tect the accused and provide fair trials. '37 The protection of indi-
vidual rights was of preeminent importance to pre-colonial
societies.
Many of the Akamba and Akan socio-political norms and struc-
tures were common to other pre-colonial ethno-political entities or
cultural-nations. This Article refers to these shared basic values as
the index of the African cultural fingerprint, that is, a set of institu-
tional and normative values governing the relationship between
individuals, the society, and nature. To be sure, the fingerprint
belongs to Africa although it is also human and, thus, aspects of it
reveal universal characteristics. In the search for the definition of
the continent, for what sets it apart from Asia and Europe or the
33. Wiredu, supra note 25, at 252 (emphasis added). He notes, further, that neither at
the "lineage level nor at any other level of Akan society could a citizen be subjected to any
sort of sanctions without proof of wrongdoing." Id. Even dead bodies were tried
posthumously before a symbolic sentence could be imposed.
34. See generally Ayisi, supra note 21, at 64-70.
35. Fernyhough, supra note 19, at 56.
36. Id. at 61. See generally Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law (Max
Gluckman ed., 1969).
37. Fernyhough, supra note 19, at 62. For example, in the Tio kingdom in present-day
Brazzaville, the Congo, "as elsewhere in Africa, a strong tradition of jurisprudence existed,
with specific rulings for penalties cited as precedents, such as levels of fines for adultery".
Id. Among the Akamba, for instance, the offense of assault carried numerous fines, which
varied depending on the degree of assault and whether it resulted in the loss of a limb or
limbs. See Hobley, supra note 31, at 79.
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Americas, some writers have labelled the cultural and social pat-
terns distinctive to the continent as the "African personality. '38
L6opold S6dar Senghor, for one, called it negritude or "the manner
of self-expression of the black character, the black world, black civ-
ilization," while Aimd C6saire described it simply as "recognition
of the fact of being black, and the acceptance of that fact, of our
destiny of black, of our history and our culture. '39 Julius Nyerere
named it ujamaa, the Kiswahili term for African socialism.40 The
principles and ideals common to all these conceptions are, accord-
ing to the author's own observations of various African societies,
respect for, and protection of, the individual and individuality
within the family and the greater socio-political unit; deference to
age because a long life is generally wise and knowledgeable; com-
mitment and responsibility to other individuals, family, and commu-
nity; solidarity with fellow human beings, especially in times of
need; tolerance for difference in political views and personal ability;
reciprocity in labor issues and for generosity; and consultation in
matters of governance.4 As aptly put by Cohen,
38. See generally Joseph Ki-Zerbo, African Personality and the New African Society, in
Independent Black Africa: the Politics of Freedom 46-59 (William J. Hanna ed., 1964).
39. Lopold S. Senghor, ProbImatique de la negritude, in LiberM 3: Ngritude et
civilisation de l'universel 269-70 (1977), quoted in Janet G. Vaillant, Black, French, and
African: A Life of Ldopold S6dar Senghor 244 (1990). The concept of "negritude" was
initially coined by Aim6 Cdsaire and Ldopold S6dar Senghor as a reaction to white racism
of the French variety. Under the philosophy of negritude, "collective organizations enfold
the individual in Africa. Yet he is not crushed. What the African knows, Senghor points
out, is that the realization of the human personality lies less in the search for singularity
than in the development of his potential through participation in a community." Id. at 257.
It emphasizes the importance of the family, nuclear and extended, the role of democratic,
consensual decision-making with the community through the council of elders, and respect
for nature.
40. The concept of ujamaa, the Kiswahili concept for kinship, was based on three
prongs: (i) respect, where each family member recognized the place and rights of others
within the family; (ii) common ownership of property, that all must have the same basic
necessities; and (iii) obligation to work, that every family member has the right to eat and
to shelter but also the obligation to work. See Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania:
Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry 98 (1980).
41. Ki-Zerbo, supra note 38. In her work on family structures, Sudarkasa groups the
cultural factors that account for the cohesion of the African family into four principles:
respect, restraint, responsibility, and reciprocity. These principles create a complex
balance of rights and duties within the family structure. See Niara Sudarkasa, African and
Afro-American Family Structure: A Comparison, 11 Black Scholar 37, 50 (Nov./Dec.
1980); see also Josiah Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African
Perspective, 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 309-31 (1987). Special mention must be made of the
importance of generosity in traditional society. As noted by Kobia, there was a "mutual
caring for one another, especially strangers and travellers." Kobia, supra note 29, at 13. It
was, for example, a "cardinal custom" in every household to prepare enough food for the
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[m]any African cultures value the group-one should
never die alone, live alone, remain outside social net-
works unless one is a pariah, insane, or the carrier of a
feared contagious disease. Corporate kinship in which
individuals are responsible for the behavior of their group
members is a widespread tradition. But in addition, the
individual person and his or her dignity and autonomy are
carefully protected in African traditions, as are individual
rights to land, individual competition for public office, and
personal success.42
Both Nyerere and Wai have argued, separately, that pre-colonial
societies supported individual welfare and dignity and did not
allow gross inequalities between members.43 To buttress his claim
that African societies "supported and practiced human rights," Wai
argues that the rulers were bound by traditional checks and bal-
ances to limit their power and guarantee a "modicum of social jus-
tice and values concerned with individual and collective rights."4
Legesse emphasizes the importance of distributive justice in "for-
mally egalitarian," as well as hierarchical, societies to ensure that
"individuals do not deviate so far from the norm that they over-
whelm society".45 Wiredu likewise tabulates a list of rights and
responsibilities borne by the Akans in the pre-colonial era. These
included rights to political participation, land, and religion, as well
as the duty to defend the nation.4 Fernyhough though not sub-
unexpected stranger. Id. Even in today's economic difficulties, Africans-rural and
urban-generally offer food to strangers and visitors.
42. Cohen, supra note 25, at 14 (emphasis added). For pre-colonial human rights
conceptions in Africa, see also Tunji Abayomi, Continuities and Changes in the
Development of Civil Liberties Litigation in Nigeria, 22 U. Tol. L Rev. 1035, 1037-41
(1991); Fasil Nahum, African Contribution to Human Rights, Paper presented at the
Seminar on Law and Human Rights in Development, Gaborone, Botswana, May 24-28,
1982 (on fie with author); Nana Kusi Appea Busia, Jr., The Status of Human Rights in
Pre-colonial Africa: Implications for Contemporary Practices, in Africa, Human Rights,
and the Global System: The Political Economy of Human Rights in a Changing World 225-
50 (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al., 1994) [hereinafter Political Economy].
43. See generally Dunstan M. Wai, Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Human
Rights Perspectives, supra note 15, at 115-44; Julius Nyerere, Essays on Socialism (1968).
44. Wai, supra note 43, at 116. He notes, further, that channels for political participation
existed in which "[d]iscussion was open and those who dissented from the majority opinion
were not punished .... There was a clear conception of freedom of expression and
association." Id. at 117.
45. Asmaron Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in The Moral
Imperatives of Human Rights: A World Survey 123, 125 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed.,
1980).
46. See generally Wiredu, supra note 25.
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scribing to a unique African concept of human rights, has outlined
many of the rights protected in pre-colonial societies, including the
rights to life, personal freedom, welfare, limited government, free
speech, conscience, and association.47 Many of these rights were
protected in complex processes of interaction between the individ-
ual and the community.
Thus far, this Article has identified and elaborated human rights
ideals which existed in pre-colonial societies. However, as in other
cultures, notions or practices that contradict concepts of human
dignity and human rights also existed, some particularly severe.
Among the Akamba, for example, a suspect in a serious crime
could be tried by a fire or water ordeal if he did not admit guilt.
4 8
When a chief died in Akan society, a common citizen's life would
be taken so that he could "accompany" the chief and "attend" to
him on his "journey to the land of the dead."' 49 This practice of
human sacrifice was a clear abrogation of the right to life, even by
Akan norms which attached an intrinsic value to every individual.
Speech and dissent rights of non-adults or minors were also
severely restricted.5 0 The discriminatory treatment of women-by
exclusion from decision-making processes and the imposition of
certain forms of labor based on gender-in the home and outside
of it flew in the face of the concept of gender equality.51 However,
these practices which were inimical to human rights are not pecu-
liar to Africa; all cultures suffer from this duality of the good and
the bad.
A number of Western academics have attacked the index of the
African cultural fingerprint and the concept it represents-the
African contribution to the human rights corpus-as false and
erroneous. In an impassioned critique of scholars she regards as
African cultural relativists, Howard notes that although "relatively
homogeneous, undifferentiated simple societies of pre-colonial
Africa" had "effective means for guaranteeing what is now known
47. See generally Fernyhough, supra note 19; Lakshman Marasinghe, Traditional
Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa, in Human Rights and Development in Africa 32
(Claude Welch & Ronald Meltzer eds., 1984).
48. In the fire ordeal, the suspect would be asked to lick a red hot sword to prove his
innocence. Hobley, supra note 31, at 81.
49. Wiredu, supra note 25, at 258.
50. Id. at 259.
51. In pre-colonial Africa, women were primarily responsible for housework including
child care. Men generally handled "public" affairs such as security and governance of the
community.
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as human rights,"5 2 there was nothing specifically African about
them. Such a model, which she calls the communitarian ideal,
"represents typical agrarian, precapitalist social relations in non-
state societies. ' 53 Elsewhere, Howard argues that industrialization
has dismantled what she refers to as the peasant worldview, or
communitarian ideal, and replaced it with "values of secularism,
personal privacy, and individualism." ''
Donnelly, in many respects Howard's ideological counterpart,
concedes that while societies based on the communitarian ideal
existed at one point in Africa, they are now the exception. He dis-
misses the notion that pre-colonial societies knew the concept of
human rights; an argument he thinks moot because the communi-
tarian ideal has been destroyed and corrupted by the "teeming
slums" of non-Western states, the money economy, and "Western"
values, products, and practices.55 In effect, both Donnelly and
Howard believe that human rights are only possible in a post-feu-
dal state, and that the concept was alien to specific pre-capitalist
traditions and ideals such as Buddhism, Islam, or pre-colonial Afri-
can societies. In other words, these traditions can make no norma-
tive contribution to the human rights corpus. But the other
implausible suggestion derived from these positions is that socie-
ties-governed under a centralized modern state-necessarily
Westernize through industrialization and urbanization. Moreover,
52. Howard, Evaluating Human Rights, supra note 20, at 176.
53. Id. at 176. Howard attempts to explain away the index or the African notions of
rights and duties by analogizing the simplicity of feudal Europe to pre-colonial Africa. In
"closed-village societies of premodern Europe. we would also discover that people thought
of themselves more as members of their own local groups than as individuals, finding a
sense of identity by fulfilling their assigned roles rather than by fulfilling themselves.' " Id.
To her, what some writers "view as essentially different African and Vestern social
structures and ways of thinking are actually differences between relatively simple and
relatively complex societies." Id. In other words, Howard believes that pre-industrial
African societies could not generate the complex concept of human rights.
54. Howard, Group Versus Individual, supra note 16, at 170. Howard believes that the
"African" worldview, which is "peasant" and "traditional," must give way to the
"Western" worldview, which is "urban" and "modem" and anchored around the
individual. She cites Kenya and Nigeria, the "more developed economies of contemporary
Africa" as examples of societies where the "traditional concept of solidarity is giving way
to individualism." Id.
55. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 119. He writes, further, that
"[in the Third World today we see most often not the persistence of traditional culture in
the face of modem intrusions, or even the development of syncretic cultures and values,
but rather a disruptive 'Westernization', cultural confusion, or the enthusiastic embrace of
'modem' practices and values." Id.
1995]
356 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
such societies become fertile ground for the germination of human
rights.
Donnelly and Howard dismiss with too much haste the argument
that many Africans are still influenced by pre-colonial norms and
notions. They assume, apparently without adequate research, that
the old ways have been eroded by modernization. The examples
that Howard gives, those of Kenya and Nigeria, two of the "more
developed" economies on the continent, in fact point in the oppo-
site direction: that in spite of the ubiquity of the centralized mod-
ernizing state, kinship ties and group-centered forms of
consciousness still influence growing urban populations. Matters
concerning marriage, birth, and death are still supported by exten-
sive family and kinship networks. This is evident even among the
peoples of South Africa and Zambia, Africa's most urbanized
countries. Fernyhough, correctly finds "Howard's assessment of
the new culture of modernity, like her new 'modern' African,
strangely unsophisticated and lacking in sensitivity. '56 It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, he adds, to "measure individuation or judge
changing worldviews by counting radios and cinemas. ' '57 Without a
doubt, pre-colonial values have been undermined and deeply
affected by the forces of change. But it is difficult to believe that
this process will completely invalidate them, just as it is unlikely
that the modernization of Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia will
completely destroy the cultural norms and forms of consciousness
evolved through Buddhism and Islam.
Donnelly and Howard face other problems as well. The first dif-
ficulty, and perhaps the most troublesome, is the implication in
their works that only European liberalism-a philosophy they
seem to think inevitable under modernization-can be the founda-
tion for the concept of human rights. Although Donnelly and
Howard would deny it, this argument in effect destroys any claim
of universality because it places the concept of human rights exclu-
sively within a specific culture. Unless they believe that the ideals
of liberalism are inherently universal, it is impossible to reconcile
their assertion that the concept of human rights is universal, while
at the same time assigning to it uniqueness and cultural specificity.
The second difficulty, which is an extension of the first, is the
implied duty on Westerners to impose the concept of human rights
on non-European cultures and societies because it is a universal
56. Fernyhough, supra note 19, at 49.
57. Id.
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concept that all societies must accept for their own good. Seen
from other cultural perspectives, such a view barely masks the his-
torical pattern by the West-first realized through colonialism-to
dominate the world by remaking it for the benefit and in the image
of Europe.
This conflict between Howard and Donnelly, on the one hand,
and their opponents, on the other, is summed up beautifully by
Fernyhough who illustrates how politicized the debate about the
origin of the concept and content of human rights has become:
From one perspective the human rights tradition was
quite foreign to Africa until Western, "modernizing"
intrusions dislocated community and denied newly iso-
lated individuals access to customary ways of protecting
their lives and human dignity. Human rights were alien to
Africa precisely because it was precapitalist, preindustrial,
decentralized, and characterized by communal forms of
social organization. From the opposing viewpoint there is
a fundamental rejection of this as a new, if rather subtle,
imperialism, an explicit denial that human rights evolved
only in Western political theory and practice, especially
during the American and French revolutions, and not in
Africa.58
Fernyhough adds, and this author agrees, that the protest of
those who reject the chauvinistic view of the West articulate the
"very plausible claim that human rights are not founded in Western
values alone but may also have emerged from very different and
distinctive African cultural milieus. '5 9 It is impossible to sustain
the argument made by Donnelly and Howard because of its inter-
nal inconsistency and ethnocentric, moral arrogance. Conversely,
African writers who claim a distinctively African concept of human
rights exaggerate its uniqueness. By implication they make the
point that such a concept could not have any universal application,
a position which fails to recoghize that concepts of human dig-
nity-the basis of a concept of human rights-are inherent in all
human societies. As Fernyhough notes:
58. Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 40-41. To argue, as Donnelly and Howard do, that the individual in pre-
colonial African societies was not entitled, in certain circumstances, to be left alone-for
that is what the concept of human rights is partially about-betrays gross and surprising
ignorance about African societies.
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Thus Donnelly and Howard contend that in pre-colonial
Africa, as in most non-Western and preindustrial socie-
ties, forms of social and political organization rendered
the means to attain human dignity primarily through
duties and obligations, often expressed in a communally
oriented social idiom and realized within a redistributive
economy. Yet both reject with unwarranted emphasis the
notion that in the search for guarantees to uphold human
life and dignity precolonial Africans formulated or corre-
lated such claims to protection in terms of human rights.60
It is indeed the notion, common to all societies, that human
beings are special and worthy of protection that distinguishes
humans from animals. The dogged insistence, even in the face of
evidence to the contrary, on the exclusive or distinctive "posses-
sion" of human rights has no real place in serious scholarship; the
only purpose of such a claim could only lie either in the desire to
assert cultural superiority or to deny it. It would be more fruitful
to vigorously study other cultures and seek to understand how they
protect-and also abuse-human rights.
Above all else, the view of the ethnocentric universalist is at best
counterproductive. It serves only to alienate state authorities who
would purposefully manipulate concepts in order to continue their
repressive practices. How are human rights to be realized univer-
sally if cultural chauvinists insist that only their version is valid?
Through coercion of other societies or modern civilizing crusades?
The only hope for those who care about the adherence by all com-
munities to human rights is the painstaking study of each culture to
identify norms and ideals that are in consonance with universal
standards. Only by locating the basis for the cultural legitimacy of
certain human rights and mobilizing social forces on that score can
respect for universal standards be forged. It would be ridiculous,
for example, for an African state to claim that, on the basis of Afri-
can culture, it could detain its own citizens without trial. As An-
Na'im succinctly explains:
Enhancing the cultural legitimacy for a given human right
should mobilize political forces within a community,
inducing those in power to accept accountability for the
implementation or enforcement of that right. With inter-
nal cultural legitimacy, those in power could no longer
60. Id. at 39.
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argue that national sovereignty is demeaned through
compliance with standards set for the particular human
right as an external value. Compliance with human rights
standards would be seen as a legitimate exercise of
national sovereignty and not as an external limitation.61
III. No RIGHTs WrrHoU-r DUTrms: AN AFRICAN DIALECrIC
Except for the African Charter's clawback clauses6 and provi-
sions concerning peoples' rights, much of the criticism of the Char-
ter has been directed at its inclusion of duties on individuals.6 This
criticism, which this author shared at one point, appears to be
driven primarily by the gross and persistent violations of human
rights in post-colonial African states and the fear that vesting more
power in the states can only result in more abuses.' This fear
aside, this Article will examine the concept of duty in pre-colonial
African societies and demonstrate its validity in conceptualizing a
unitary, integrated conception of human rights in which the
extreme individualism of current human rights norms is tempered
by the individual's obligation to the society.
Capturing the view of many Africans, Okere has written that the
"African conception of man is not that of an isolated and abstract
individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit
61. Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human
Rights, in Cross-Cultural Perspectives, supra note 7, 331, 332.
62. Clawback clauses qualify rights and permit a state to restrict them to the extent
permitted by domestic law. Their purpose, apparently, is to place vague constraints on
government action against the individual. For an example, article 6 of the African Charter
provides, in part, that "[e]very individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security
of his person. No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions
previously laid down by law." African Charter, supra note 1, art. 6, 21 IL.M. at 60
(emphasis added). The Charter has also been criticized for the weaknesses inherent in its
enforcement mechanisms. See Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, The African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, in Human Rights Practice Guide, supra note 3, at 159.167-
69. See generally N.R.L. Haysom, The African Charter Inspirational Document or False
Start, paper presented at the Bill of Rights Conference, Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, Dec. 10-
14, 1994; Olosula Ojo & Amadu Sessay, The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the
1980s and Beyond, 8 Human Rights Quarterly, 89 (No. 1 1994).
63. See, e.g., Flinterman & Ankumah, supra note 62, at 166-67; Makau wa Mutua, The
African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective: The Need for Urgent
Reformulation, 5 Legal F. 31, 33 (1993) [hereinafter African Human Rights System];
Amnesty International, Amnesty International's Observations on Possible Reform of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1993).
64. Mutua, African Human Rights System, supra note 63, at 32. For duties imposed on
individuals, see African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 27-29, 21 IL.M. at 63.
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of solidarity." 65 Keba Mbaye, the renown African jurist, has stated
that in Africa "laws and duties are regarded as being two facets of
the same reality: two inseparable realities." 66 This philosophy has
been summed up by Mbiti as well: "I am because we are, and
because we are therefore I am."'67 According to this view, individu-
als are not atomistic units "locked in a constant struggle against
society for the redemption of their rights." 68 The Dinka concept of
cieng, for example, "places emphasis on such human values as dig-
nity, integrity, honor, and respect for self and others, loyalty and
piety, compassion and generosity, and unity and harmony. ' ' 69 But
cieng not only attunes "individual interests to the interests of
others; it requires positive assistance to one's fellow human
beings."70 Among the Bantu peoples of east and southern Africa,
the concept of a person, mundu in Kikamba or mtu in Kiswahili, is
not merely descriptive; it is also normative and refers to an individ-
ual who lives in peace and is helpful to his community.71 L6opold
Senghor, then president of Senegal, captured this view at a meeting
of African legal experts in 1979:
Room should be made for this African tradition in our
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, while bathing in
our philosophy, which consists in not alienating the subor-
dination of the individual to the community, in co-exist-
ence, in giving everyone a certain number of rights and
duties.72
65. B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African
Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the
European and American Systems, 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 141, 148 (1984).
66. International Commission of Jurists, Human and Peoples' Rights in Africa and the
African Charter 27 (1986).
67. The individual's needs, rights, joys, and sorrows are woven into a social tapestry that
denies singular individuality. John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy 141 (1970).
68. Kiwanuka, supra note 5, at 82.
69. Deng, supra note 17, at 266.
70. Id.
71. The word Bantu consists of ntu, a root, which means human-ness. Quite often,
speakers of Kikamba or Kiswahili will rhetorically ask of an abusive person if he is or has
become an animal. An individual is not a mundu or a mtu, and loses his human-ness if he
abuses or mistreats fellow community members.
72. Address of President L6opold Sddar Senghor of Senegal to the Meeting of Experts
for the Preparation of the Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Dakar,
Senegal (Nov. 28-Dec. 8, 1979), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.1, at 6; also reprinted in
Philip Kunig et al., Regional Protection of Human Rights by International Law: The
Emerging African System 123 (1985) [hereinafter Emerging African System].
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In practical terms, this philosophy of the group-centered individ-
ual evolves through a series of carefully taught rights and responsi-
bilities. At the root were structures of social and political
organization, informed by gender and age, which served to
enhance solidarity and ensure the existence of the community into
perpetuity. The Kikuyu of Kenya, for example, achieved a two-
tiered form of community organization: at the base was the family
group composed of blood relatives, namely a man and his wife or
wives, their children, and grand-children, and often great grand-
children; the second tier consisted of the clan, a combination of
several family groups bearing the same name and believed to have
descended from one ancestor.7 3 Social status and prestige were
based on the execution of duties within a third tier: the age-group.
Marriage conferred eligibility for the elders council, the governing
body.74 Like the Kikuyu, the Akamba were organized in similar
lineages and age-groups, culminating in the elders council, the
supreme community organ. 5 The Akan organizational chart also
was similar.76
Relationships, rights, and obligations flowed from these organi-
zational structures, giving the community cohesion and viability.
Certain obligations, such as the duty to defend the community and
its territory, attached by virtue of birth and group membership. In
the age-grading system of the Akamba, for example, each able-
bodied male had to join the anake grade which defended the com-
munity and made war.' In return for their services, the warriors
were allowed to graduate into a more prestigious bracket, whereby
others would defend them and their property thereafter. The
expectations were similar among the Akans:
But if every Akan was thus obligated by birth to contrib-
ute to defense in one way or another, there was also the
complementary fact that he had a right to the protection
of his person, property, and dignity, not only in his own
state but also outside it. And states were known to go to
war to secure the freedom of their citizens abroad or
avenge their mistreatment.7 1
73. Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya 1-2 (1953); see also HE. Lambert, Kikuyu
Social and Political Institutions (1965).
74. Kenyatta, supra note 73, at 200.
75. Muthiani, supra note 27, at 80-85.
76. See generally Wiredu, supra note 25.
77. Muthiani, supra note 27, at 82.
78. Wiredu, supra note 25, at 249.
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Defense of the community, a state-type right exacted on those
who came under its protection, was probably the most serious posi-
tive public obligation borne by young men. The commission of cer-
tain offenses, such as murder, treason, and cowardice, were also
regarded as public offenses or crimes against the public dimension
of the community or state, imposing negative public duties on the
individual. But most individual duties attached at the family and
kinship levels and were usually identifiable through naming: an
aunt was expected to act like a mother, an uncle like a father.79
This is the basis of the saying, found in many African cultures, that
it takes a whole village to raise a child.80 As Cobbah correctly
explains, the naming of individuals within the kinship structure
"defines and institutionalizes" the family member's required social
role. These roles, which to the Western outsider may appear to be
only of morally persuasive value, are "essentially rights which each
kinship member customarily possesses, and duties which each kin-
ship member has toward his kin."8' Expressed differently, "the
right of one kinship member is the duty of the other and the duty
of the other kinship member is the right of another.8 Sudarkasa
and Cobbah thematically group the principles tying the kinship sys-
tem together around respect, restraint, responsibility, and reciproc-
ity.8 3 In a very real sense, "entitlements and obligations form the
very basis of the kinship system." s
The consciousness of rights and correlative duties is ingrained in
community members from birth. Through every age-grade, the
harmonization of individual interests with those of the grade is
instilled unremittingly. As Kenyatta remarked, the age-group is a
79. In Africa, "the extended family unit, like family units in nearly all societies, assigns
each member a social role that permits the family to operate as a reproductive, economic
and socialization unit." Cobbah, supra note 41, at 320. But unlike the West, kinship
terminologies in Africa relate to actual duties and obligations borne by members.
Furthermore, the terminologies are more encompassing: aunts and mothers, for example,
have similar roles within the kinship unit, regardless of biological parentage. The same is
true of uncles and older cousins. Id.
80. Most pre-colonial African villages were be inhabited by people related through
blood or marriage.
81. Cobbah, supra note 41, at 321.
82. Id.
83. This matrix of group solidarity revolves around respect, based on seniority in age;
restraint or the balancing of individual rights with the requirements of the group;
responsibility, which requires commitment to work with and help others in return for
security; and reciprocity through which generous acts are returned. Id. at 322; see also
Sudarkasa, supra note 41, at 50.
84. Cobbah, supra note 41, at 322.
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"powerful instrument for securing conformity" with the commu-
nity's values; the "selfish or reckless youth is taught by the opinion
of his gang that it does not pay to incur displeasure." s Through
age-groups and the "strength and numbers of the social ties," 6
community solidarity is easily transmitted and becomes the basis
for cohesion and stability. Furthermore, initiation ceremonies-
for both girls and boys-taught gender roles and sexual morality.s7
Among the Kikuyu, a series of ceremonies culminating in clito-
ridectomy for girls and circumcision for boys, marked passage into
adulthood. Clitoridectomy, which was brought under sharp attack
first by Christian missionaries and now by Western or Western-
inspired human rights advocates, was a critical departure point in
socialization.
This conception, that of the individual as a moral being endowed
with rights but also bounded by duties, proactively uniting his
needs with the needs of others, was the quintessence of the formu-
lation of rights in pre-colonial societies. It radically differs from
the liberal conception of the individual as the state's primary
antagonist. Moreover, it provides those concerned with the univer-
sal conception of human rights with a basis for imagining another
dialectic: the harmonization of duties and rights. Many of those
who dismiss the relevance of the African conception of man by
pejoratively referring to it as a "peasant" and "pre-industrial"
notion fail to recognize that all major cultures and traditions-the
Chinese, European, African, and the Arab, to mention a few-
have a basic character distinctive to them. While it is true that no
culture is static, and that normative cultural values are forever
evolving, it is naive to think that a worldview can be eroded in a
matter of decades, even centuries. Why should the concession be
made that the individualist rights perspective is "superior" to more
community-oriented notion? As Cobbah has noted, "in the same
way that people in other cultures are brought up to assert their
independence from their community, the average African's
worldview is one that places the individual within his commu-
nity."s This African worldview, he writes, "is for all intents and
85. Kenyatta, supra note 73, at 115. Kenyatta writes that "early and late, by rules of
conduct in individual instances, by the sentiment of the group in which he lives, by rewards
and punishments and fears of ceremonial uncleanness, the younger generation learns the
respect and obedience due to parents. The older generation do likewise." Id.
86. Id. at 116-17.
87. See id. at 130-54.
88. Cobbah, supra note 41, at 323.
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purposes as valid as the European theories of individualism and
the social contract."89 Any concept of human rights with preten-
sions of universality cannot avoid mediating between these two
seemingly contradictory notions.
IV. PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS FOR THE
DuTY/RIGHTS CONCEPTION
The idea of combining individual rights and duties in a human
rights document is not completely without precedent. No less a
document than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) blazed the trail in this regard when it provided, in a rare
departure from its individualist focus, that "[e]veryone has the
duties to the community in which alone the free and full develop-
ment of his personality is possible." 90 However, the African Char-
ter is the first human rights document to articulate the concept in
any meaningful way. It is assumed, with undue haste, by human
rights advocates and scholars that the inclusion of duties in the
African Charter is nothing but "an invitation to the imposition of
unlimited restrictions on the enjoyment of rights."9' This view is
simplistic because it is not based on a careful assessment of the
difficulties experienced by African countries in their miserable
attempts to mimic wholesale Western notions of government and
the role of the state. Such critics are transfixed by the allure of
models of democracy prevalent in the industrial democracies of the
West, models which promise an opportunity for the redemption of
a troubled continent.
Unfortunately, such a view is shortsighted. Perhaps at no other
time in the history of the continent have Africans needed each
other more than they do today. Although there is halting progress
towards democratization in some African countries, the continent
is generally on a fast track to political and economic collapse. Now
in the fourth decade of post-colonialism, African states have
89. Id.
90. UDHR, supra note 3, art. 29. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, International Conference of American States, 9th Conf. (1948),
O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer. .rV/1.4 Rev. XX (1965), also proclaimed a list of 27 human rights
and ten duties. Buergenthal, supra note 3, at 128. The American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 3, did not follow the same course.
91. Buergenthal, supra note 3, at 178. Others, such as Haysom, have made blanket
condemnations of the concept of duties. Fearing that the concept of duties could be used
to suppress rights guaranteed by the African Charter, Haysom has written that the
"interpretation of a duty towards the community as to mean duty towards the state, lends
itself to an autocratic style of Government." Haysom, supra note 62, at 6.
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largely failed to forge viable, free, and prosperous countries. The
persistence of this problem highlights the dismal failures of the
post-colonial states on several accounts. The new African states
have failed to inspire loyalty in the citizenry; to produce a political
class with integrity and a national interest; to inculcate in the mili-
tary, the police, and the security forces their proper roles in society;
to build a nation from different linguistic and cultural groups; and
to fashion economically viable policies. These realities are driving
a dagger into the heart of the continent. There are many causes of
the problem, and, while it is beyond the scope of this Article to
address them all, it will discuss one: namely, the human rights
dimensions of the relationship between the individual, the commu-
nity, and the state.
Colonialism profoundly transformed and mangled the political
landscape of the continent through the imposition of the modern
state.92 Each pre-colonial African "nation," and there were
thousands of them to be sure, had several characteristics: one eth-
nic community inhabited a "common territory; its members shared
a tradition, real or fictitious, of common descent; and they were
held together by a common language and a common culture."'
Few African nations were also states in the modem or European
sense, although they were certainly political societies. In contrast,
the states created by European imperialists, comprising the over-
whelming majority of the continent, ordinarily contained more
than one nation:
Each one of the new states contains more than one
nation. In their border areas, many new states contain
parts of nations because of the European-inspired borders
cut across existing national territories?4
The new state contained a population from many cultural groups
coerced to live together. It did not reflect a "nation," a people with
the consciousness of a common destiny and shared history and cul-
ture.95 The colonialists were concerned with the exploitation of
92. For a commanding history of the continent, spanning the pre-colonial era to the
present, see Basil Davidson, Africa in History (1991); see also Ali A. Mazrui, The Africans:
A Triple Heritage (1986).
93. K. A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy 31 (1967). Hansen defines a nation as
"a group that shares a common history and identity and is aware of that; they are a people,
not just a population." Art Hansen, African Refugees: Defining and Defending Their
Human Rights, in Human Rights and Governance, supra note 19, at 139, 161.
94. Hansen, supra note 93, at 161.
95. According to Busia, the
1995]
366 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Africa's human and natural resources, and not with the mainte-
nance of the integrity of African societies. For purposes of this
expediency, grouping many nations in one territory was the only
feasible administrative option. To compound the problem, the new
rulers employed divide-and-conquer strategies, pitting nations
against each other, further polarizing inter-ethnic tensions and cre-
ating a climate of mutual fear, suspicion, and hatred. In many
cases, the Europeans would openly favor one group or cluster of
nations over others, a practice that only served to intensify ten-
sions. For example, in Rwanda, a country rife with some of the
worst inter-communal violence since decolonization, the Belgians
heightened Hutu-Tutsi rivalry through preferential treatment
toward the Tutsi.96
Ironically, colonialism, though a divisive factor, created a sense
of brotherhood or unity among different African nations within the
same colonial state, because they saw themselves as common vic-
tims of an alien, racist, and oppressive structure. 97 Nevertheless, as
the fissures of the modem African state amply demonstrate, the
unity born out of anti-colonialism has not sufficed to create an
enduring identity of nationhood in the context of the post-colonial
state. Since in the pre-colonial era the primary allegiances were
centered on lineage and the community,98 one of the most difficult
challenges facing the post-colonial political class was the creation
of new nations. This challenge, referred to as "creating a national
consciousness ...was misleading," as there was "no nation to
new African States are composed of many different tribes. A state can claim to
be a common territory for all the tribes within it, but common descent, real or
fictitious, cannot be maintained among tribes, some of which have a history of
different origins and migrations, such as the Buale, Senufo, Guro of the Ivory
Coast; the Yoruba, Hausa, Ibo of Nigeria; Ewe, Fanti, Dagomba of Ghana ....
Instead of the bond of a common culture and language, there are language and
cultural differences which tend to divide rather unite.
Busia, supra note 93, at 33; see also Mutua, Redrawing the Map, supra note 14.
96. Although, before the arrival of the Belgians, the Tutsi minority ruled over the Hutu
majority and the Twa in a feudal-client relationship, the colonial state "transformed
communal relations and sharpened ethnic tensions by ruling through a narrow Tutsi
royalty. The access to resources and power that the Tutsi collaborators enjoyed under the
colonial state irreversibly polarized Hutu-Tutsi relations." Makau wa Mutua, U.N. Must
Make Rwanda a Priority, Oakland Tribune, May 25, 1994, at A13.
97. "One need not go into the history of colonisation of Africa, but that colonisation had
one significant result. A sentiment was created on the African continent-a sentiment of
oneness." Mazrui, supra note 92, at 108, quoting Julius Nyerere, Africa's Place in the
World, Wellesley College Symposium at 149 (1960).
98. Busia, supra note 93, at 30.
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become conscious of; the nation had to be created concurrently
with a consciousness."9
This difficult social and political transformation from self-gov-
erning ethno-cultural units to the multi-lingual, multi-cultural mod-
em state-the disconnection between the two Africas: one pre-
colonial, the other post-colonial-lies at the root of the current cri-
sis. The post-colonial state has not altered the imposed European
forms of social and political organization even though there is
mounting evidence that they have failed to work in Africa.Ic ° Part
of the problem lies in the domination of the continent's political
and social processes by Eurocentric norms and values. As cor-
rectly put by Hansen:
African leaders have adopted and continued to use polit-
ical forms and precedents that grew from, and were
organically related to, the European experience. Formal
declarations of independence from direct European rule
do not mean actual independence from European concep-
tual dominance. African leaders and peoples have gone
through tremendous political changes in the past hundred
years. These profound changes have included the trans-
formation of African societies and polities. They are still
composed of indigenous African units, such as the lineage,
village, tribe, and chieftainship, but they have been trans-
formed around European units, such as the colony, district,
political party, and state.010
This serious and uniquely African crisis lacks the benefit of any
historical guide or formula for its resolution. While acknowledging
that it is impossible to recapture and re-institute pre-colonial forms
of social and political organization, this Article nonetheless asserts
that Africa must partially look inward, to its pre-colonial past, for
possible solutions. Certain ideals in pre-colonial African philoso-
phy, particularly the conception of humanity, and the interface of
rights and duties in a communal context as provided for in the
African Charter, should form part of that process of reconstruc-
tion. The European domination of Africa has wrought social
99. Hansen, supra note 93, at 161-62.
100. Id. at 161. Hansen notes that the "most obvious and powerful expressions of the
continued African conceptual reliance on European political forms are the African states
themselves. The states are direct and uncritical successors of the colonies." Id. (emphasis
added).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
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changes which have disabled old institutions by complicating social
and political processes. Pre-colonial and post-colonial societies
now differ fundamentally. In particular, there are differences of
scale; states now have large and varied populations. Moreover,
states possess enormous instruments of control and coercion, and
their tasks are now without number. While this is true, Africa can-
not move forward by completely abandoning its past.
The duty/rights conception of the African Charter could provide
a new basis for individual identification with compatriots, the com-
munity, and the state. It could forge and instill a national con-
sciousness and act as the glue to reunite individuals and different
nations within the modern state, and at the same time set the
proper limits of conduct by state officials. The motivation and pur-
pose behind the concept of duty in pre-colonial societies was to
strengthen community ties and social cohesiveness, creating a
shared fate and common destiny. This is the consciousness that the
impersonal modem state has been unable to foster.102 It has failed
to shift loyalties from the lineage and the community to the mod-
em state, with its mixture of different nations.
The series of explicit duties spelled out in articles 27 through 29
of the African Charter could be read as intended to recreate the
bonds of the pre-colonial era among individuals and between indi-
viduals and the state. °3 They represent a rejection of the individ-
ual "who is utterly free and utterly irresponsible and opposed to
society".' 4 In a proper reflection of the nuanced nature of societal
obligations in the pre-colonial era, the African Charter explicitly
provides for two types of duties: direct and indirect. A direct duty
is contained, for example, in article 29(4) of the Charter which
requires the individual to "preserve and strengthen social and
national solidarity, particularly when the latter is threatened." 0 5
There is nothing inherently sinister about this provision; it merely
repeats a duty formerly imposed on members of pre-colonial com-
munities. If anything, there exists a heightened need today, more
102. In his discussion of the absence of the requirements of empirical statehood in post-
colonial Africa, Jackson has written that, in these "ramshackle" regimes, "[clitizenship
means little and carries few substantial rights or duties compared with membership in a
family, clan, religious sect or ethnic community. Often the 'government' cannot govern
itself, and its officials may in fact be freelancers, charging what amounts to a private fee for
their services." Robert H. Jackson, Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa 46 J. Int'l
Aff. 1 (1992).
103. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 45, 21 I.L.M. at 65.
104. See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.1, supra note 72, at 2.
105. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 29, para. 4, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
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than at any other time in recent history, to fortify communal rela-
tions and defend national solidarity. The threat of the collapse of
the post-colonial state, as has been the case in Liberia, Somalia,
and Rwanda, is only too real. Political elites as well as the common
citizenry, each in equal measure, bear the primary responsibility
for avoiding societal collapse and its devastating consequences.
The African Charter provides an example of an indirect duty in
article 27(2), which states that "[t]he rights and freedoms of each
individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others,
collective security, morality and common interest." 10 6 This duty is
in fact a limitation on the enjoyment of certain individual rights. It
merely recognizes the practical reality that in African societies, as
elsewhere in the world, individual rights are not absolute. Individ-
uals are asked to reflect on how the exercise of their rights in certain
circumstances might adversely affect other individuals or the com-
munity. The duty is based on the presumption that the full devel-
opment of the individual is only possible where individuals care
about how their actions would impact on others. By rejecting the
egotistical individual whose only concern is fulfilling self, article
27(2) raises the level of care owed to neighbors and the
community.
Duties are also grouped according to whether they are owed to
individuals or to larger units such as the family, society, or the
state. Parents, for example, are owed a duty of respect and mainte-
nance by their children.10 7 Crippling economic problems do not
allow African states to contemplate some of the programs of the
welfare state. The care of the aged and needy falls squarely on
family and community members. This requirement-a necessity
today-has its roots in the past: it was unthinkable to abandon a
parent or relative in need.1 0a The family guilty of such an omission
106. Id. art. 27, para. 2, 21 IL.M. at 63.
107. Article 29 of the African Charter provides that the individual shall have the duty to
"preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and
respect of the family, to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need."
Id. art. 29, para. 1, 21 LL.M. at 63. The state, however, does not shirk responsibility for the
aged and disabled. The Charter gives them "the right to special measures of protection in
keeping with their physical or moral needs." Id. art. 18, para. 4, 21 I.LM. at 62.
108. In defense of the duty of the individual to parents, the aged, and the needy, Isaac
Nguema, the first chair of the African Commission, has rhetorically asked: "[hiow can
society be so ungrateful to people who once helped to build it, on the grounds that they
have become a burden, maybe no more than waste?" Isaac Nguema, Universality and
Specificity in Human Rights in Africa, The Courier, NovJDec. 1989, at 16, 17. He pleads
for Africa to "foster the cult and the veneration of the aged." Id.
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would be held in disgrace and contempt pending the intervention
of lineage or clan members. Such problems explain why the family
is considered sacred and why it would be simply impracticable and
suicidal for Africans to adopt wholesale the individualist concep-
tion of rights. Duty to the family is emphasized elsewhere in the
Charter because of its crucial and indispensable economic utility.10 9
Economic difficulties and the dislocations created by the transfor-
mation of rural life by the cash economy make the homestead a
place of refuge.
Some duties are owed by the individual to the state. These are
not distinctive to African states; many of them are standard obliga-
tions that any modem state places on its citizens. In the African
context, however, these obligations have a basis in the past, and
many seem relevant because of the fragility and the domination of
Africa by external agents. Such duties are rights that the commu-
nity or the state, defined as all persons within it, holds against the
individual. They include the duties to "preserve and strengthen
social and national solidarity;" 110 not to "compromise the security
of the State;""' to serve the "national community by placing his
physical and intellectual abilities at its service;""112 to "pay taxes
imposed by law in the interest of the society; 11 3 and to "preserve
and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integ-
rity of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance
with the law.""' 4
The duties that require the individual to strengthen and defend
national independence, security, and the territorial integrity of the
state are inspired by the continent's history of domination and
occupation by outside powers over the centuries." 5 The duties
represent an extension of the principle of self-determination, used
109. Article 27(1) of the African Charter provides, inter alia, that "[e]very individual
shall have duties towards his family." African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 1, 21
LL.M. at 63.
110. Id. art. 29, para. 4, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
111. Id. art. 29, para. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
112. Id. art. 29, para. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
113. Id. art. 29, para. 6, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
114. Id. art. 29, para. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
115. It would be surprising if the first Africa-wide human rights document did not show
sensitivity to the subjugation of African peoples, a condition that has largely defined what
the continent is today. Beginning with the invasion, enslavement, and colonization by
Arabs and later the Europeans, Africans have been keenly aware of the traumatic
consequences of the loss of sovereignty over their political and social life. As a general
rule, they have not exercised domination over others; that ledger is heavily weighted
against them.
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in the external sense, as a shield against foreign occupation. Even
in countries where this history is lacking, the right of the state to be
defended by its citizens can trump certain individual rights, such as
the draft of younger people for a war effort. Likewise, the duty to
place one's intellectual abilities at the service of the state is a legiti-
mate state interest, for the "brain drain" has robbed Africa of mas-
sive intellect.'16 In recognition of the need for the strength of
diversity, rather than its power to divide, the Charter asks individu-
als to promote African unity, an especially critical role given arbi-
trary balkanization by the colonial powers and the ethnic
animosities fostered within and between the imposed states.1 17
In addition to the duties placed on the state to secure for the
people within its borders economic, social, and cultural rights, the
Charter also requires the state to protect the family, which it terms
"the natural unit and basis of society""" and the "custodian of
morals and traditional values.""19 There is an enormous potential
for advocates of equality rights to be concerned that these provi-
sions could be used to support the patriarchy and other repressive
practices of pre-colonial social ordering. It is now generally
accepted that one of the strikes against the pre-colonial regime was
its strict separation of gender roles and, in many cases, the limita-
tion on, or exclusion of, women from political participation. The
discriminatory treatment of women on the basis of gender in mar-
riage, property ownership, and inheritance, and the disproportion-
ately heavy labor and reproduction burdens were violations of
their rights.
However, these are not the practices that the Charter condones
when it requires states to assist families as the "custodians of
morals and traditional values." Such an interpretation would be a
cynical misreading of the Charter. 20 The reference is to those
116. Although the "brain drain" is partially a result of the abusive state, the cost of
education is so high that a state is entitled to ask its educated elites to contribute to
national welfare.
117. Every African is required to "contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and
at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity." African Charter, supra
note 1, art. 29, par. 8,21 LL.M. at 63. "[AII levels" here implies, inter alia. unity between
different ethnic groups within the same state. This provision reflects a recognition by the
Charter of the destructive power of ethnic hatred or tribalism, the term Westerners prefer
when referring to ethnic tensions in Africa.
118. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 1, 21 LLM. at 61.
119. Id. art. 18, para. 2, 21 IL.M. at 61.
120. The Charter's reference to "traditional values" cannot in good faith be interpreted
as a call for the continued oppression of women. The Charter requires the individual to
"preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with other
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traditional values which enhanced the dignity of the individual and
emphasized the dignity of motherhood and the importance of the
female as the central link in the reproductive chain; women were
highly valued as equals in the process of the regeneration of life.
The Charter guarantees, unambiguously and without equivocation,
the equal rights of women in its gender equality provision by
requiring states to "eliminate every discrimination against women"
and to protect women's rights in international human rights instru-
ments. 121 Read in conjunction with other provisions, the Charter
leaves no room for discriminatory treatment against women.
The articulation of the duty conception in the Charter has been
subjected to severe criticism. Some of the criticism, however, has
confused the African conception of duty with the socialist or Marx-
ist understanding. 122 Such confusion is unfortunate. In socialist
ideology, states-not individuals-are subjects of international
law.' 23 Thus the state assumes obligations under international law,
through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) for example, to provide human rights. 24 Under social-
ism, the state secures economic, cultural, and social benefits for the
individual. Hence, the state, as the guardian of public interest,
retains primacy in the event of conflict with the individual. 125
Human rights, therefore, are conditioned on the interest of the
state and the goals of communist development. 126 There is an
organic unity between rights and duties to the state. 27 In this col-
members of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general,
to contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of society." African Charter, supra
note 1, art. 29, para. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 63 (emphasis added).
121. "The state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and
also ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in
international declarations and conventions." Id. art. 18, para. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 62. Note,
however, that the pairing of women and children in this instance is not merely a function of
sloppy draftsmanship; it most probably betrays the sexist perception of the drafters.
122. Donnelly, for example, thinks that the Soviet or socialist conception of human
rights, reflected in practice and official doctrine, is "strikingly similar" to African and
Chinese conceptions. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 55.
123. See Vladimir Kartashkin, The Socialist Countries and Human rights, in The
International Dimensions of Human Rights 631, 645 (Karel Vasak & Philip Alston eds.,
1982).
124. Id. at 644-45.
125. Roman Wieruszewski, National Implementation of Human Rights, in Human
Rights in a Changing East-West Perspective 264, 270 (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 1990).
126. Articles 39, 50, 51, and 59 of the 1977 Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics link individual duties to the state with the enjoyment of individual rights. Konst.
SSSR, arts. 39, 50, 51, 59 (1977).
127. V. Chkhidvadze, Constitution of True Human Rights and Freedoms, 1980 Int'l Aff.
18, cited in Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 55.
[Vol. 35:339
AFRICAN CULTURAL FINGERPRINT
lectivist conception, duties are only owed to the state. In contrast,
in the pre-colonial era, and in the African Charter, duties are pri-
marily owed to the family-nuclear and extended-and to the
community, not to the state.'2 In effect, the primacy attached to
the family in the Charter places the family above the state, which is
not the case under communism.1-9 In pre-colonial Africa, unlike
the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, duties owed to the
family or community were rarely misused or manipulated to dero-
gate from human rights obligations.130
The most damaging criticism of the language of duties in Africa
sees them as "little more than the formulation, entrenchment, and
legitimation of state rights and privileges against individuals and
peoples.' 1 31 However, critics who question the value of including
duties in the Charter point only to the theoretical danger that
states might capitalize on the duty concept to violate other guaran-
teed rights. 32 The fear is frequently expressed that emphasis on
duties may lead to the "trumping" of individual rights if the two
are in opposition. 33 It is argued that:
If the state has a collective right and obligation to develop
the society, economy, and polity (Article 29), then as an
instrument it can be used to defend coercive state actions
against both individuals and constituent groups to achieve
128. Individual duties owed to intermediate groups-groups falling between the family
and the state such as ethnic, professional, and other associational entities-would seem to
be implied by article 27 which refers to "society" and "other legally recognized
communities." African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 1, 21 LLM. at 63. Such a
reading could also be attached to article 10 which refers to the "obligation of solidarity" in
associational life. Id. art. 10, para. 2, 21 LLM. at 61. "Solidarity" is both "social" and
"national." Id. art. 29, 21 LLM. at 63.
129. Article 18(1) compels the state to protect the family, the "natural unit" of society.
Id. art. 18, para. 1, 21 LL.M. at 61.
130. According to Benedek, "[t]he human rights approach to be found in traditional
African societies is characterized by a permanent dialectical relationship between the
individual and the group, which fits neither into the individualistic nor the collectivistic
concept of human rights." Wolfgang Benedek, Peoples' Rights and Individuals' Duties as
Special Features of the African Charter' on Human and Peoples' Rights, in Emerging
African System, supra note 72, at 59, 63.
131. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Human and Peoples' Rights: What Point is Africa Trying
to Make?, in Human Rights and Governance, supra note 19, at 74,78-79; see Okere, supra
note 65, at 148-49; Amnesty International, Protecting Human Rights: International
Procedures and How to Use Them 15 (1991). See generally Issa L Shivji, The Concept of
Human Rights in Africa (1989).
132. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 131, at 79.
133. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 15.
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state policies rationalized as social and economic
improvement. 134
While the human fights records of African states are distress-
ingly appalling, facts do not indicate that the zeal to promote cer-
tain economic and political programs is the root cause of human
rights abuses. The regime of Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, for exam-
ple, has not engaged in the widespread suppression of civil and
political rights because of adherence to policies it deems in the
national interest; instead, abuses have been triggered by an inse-
cure and narrow political class which will stop at nothing, including
political murder, to retain power.135 Similarly, Mobutu Sese Seko
of Zaire has run the country into the ground because he cannot
contemplate relinquishing power. 36 Alienated and corrupt elites,
quite often devoid of a national consciousness, plunder the state
and brutalize society to maintain their personal privileges and
retain power. 37 The use of the state to implement particular state
134. Id. Cohen adds that "[m]ore importantly, the dangers of supporting state power as
a fundamental 'right' are obvious. Indeed, the African record to date on that score
provides serious grounds for concern." Id. Donnelly points to the perversion of the
ordinary correlation between duties and rights in the former Soviet Union where a
totalitarian, undemocratic state manipulated the concept to abrogate individual rights.
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 55-57. However, this author
disagrees with Donnelly when he states that rights are completely independent of duties.
The link between rights and duties is a social dialectic; one implies the other.
135. For exhaustive catalogues of human rights abuses by the Kenyan government, see
Africa Watch, Kenya: Taking Liberties (1991); Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for
Human Rights, Failing the Democratic Challenge: Freedom of Expression in Multi-Party
Kenya (1993); Kenya Human Rights Commission, Independence Without Freedom: The
Legitimization of Repressive Laws and Practices in Kenya (1994). For a more conceptual
discussion about the difficulties of creating rights-respecting governments, see generally
Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy Without Human Rights 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 703 (1993);
Emerging Human Rights: The African Political Economy Context (George W. Shepherd,
Jr. & Mark O.C. Anikpo eds., 1990) (presenting theoretical considerations about emerging
rights from the standpoint of political economy); Political Economy, supra note 42; Sakah
S. Mahmud, The State and Human Rights in Africa in the 1990s: Perspectives and
Prospects, 15 Hum. Rts. Q. 485 (1993) (attributing human rights violations in Africa to the
African interpretation of human rights and to structural inadequacies).
136. For a comprehensive report on human rights abuses in Zaire, see Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Zaire: Repression As Policy (1990); Africa Watch, Zaire:
TWo Years Without Transition (1992).
137. During its first two decades after achieving independence in 1961, Tanzania, under
the leadership of Julius Nyerere and the Tanzania African National Union (TANU) and
later Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling party, appeared to be an exception to the
kleptocratic oligarchies then prevalent in Africa. The state seemed genuinely committed
to the realization of ujamaa, the policy of socialism and self-reliance. See generally Makau
wa Mutua, Tanzania's Recent Economic Reform: An Analysis, 1988 ransafrica Forum 69
(discussing Tanzania's progression towards self-reliance and socialism under Nyerere);
Hyden, supra note 40 (discussing the implementation of ujamma policies and politics in
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policies is almost never the reason, although such a rationale is fre-
quently used as the pretext. Okoth-Ogendo persuasively argues
that the attack on the duty conception is not meritorious because
the "state is the villain against which human rights law is the effec-
tive weapon" and towards which "individuals should not be called
upon to discharge any duties."'13 Valid criticism would question
the "precise boundaries, content, and conditions of compliance"
contemplated by the Charter. 3 9 It should be the duty of the Afri-
can Commission in its jurisprudence to clarify which, if any, of
these duties are moral or legal obligations, and what the scope of
their application ought to be.' 40 The Commission could lead the
way in suggesting how some of the duties-on the individual as
well as the state-might be implemented. The concept of national
service,' 4' for example, could utilize traditional notions in address-
ing famine, public works, and community self-help projects. The
care of parents and the needy1 42 could be formalized in family/state
burden-sharing. The Commission should also indicate how, and in
what forum, the state would respond to the breach of individual
duties. It might suggest the establishment of community arbitra-
tion centers to work out certain types of disputes. As suggested by
Umozurike, a former chairman to the Commission, state responsi-
bility for these duties implies a "minimum obligation to inculcate
the underlying principles and ideals in their subjects." '43
Tanzania from a political economy perspective with particular focus on the role of the
peasants).
138. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 131, at 79. The misappropriation of tradition by some
of Africa's despots and political charlatans to justify coercive measures against individuals
should not be reason for the emotional denunciation of the duty/rights conception.
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the former president of Malawi, used "traditional courts" to
silence his critics, and Mobutu Sese Seko, the long term Zairian ruler, at one point
instituted salongo, a thinly disguised colonial practice of forced labor. Both practices,
which had nothing to do with pre-colonial values, were cynically designed to increase the
state's power over the people. See Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human
Rights, Confronting the Past: Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Malawi
(1994); Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, supra note 15, at 120.
139. Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 131, at 79.
140. Article 45 of the African Charter outlines the mandate of the African Commission,
which includes the interpretation of the Charter and the formulation of principles and rules
relating to human rights. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 45, 21 I.LM. at 65.
141. Id. art. 29, 21 LL.M. at 63.
142. Id.
143. Umozurike, supra note 5, at 907. The African Charter also imposes similar
obligations on states:
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure
through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and
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The duty/rights formulation is also inextricably tied to the con-
cept, articulated in the African Charter, of peoples' rights.
Although a long discussion about the concept itself and the contro-
versy it has attracted will not be made here, this Article will outline
its necessity to the duty conception. Like the duty concept, the
idea of peoples' rights is embodied in the African philosophy which
sees men and women primarily as social beings embraced in the
body of the community.144 It was pointed out during the drafting
of the African Charter that individual rights could only be justified
in the context of the rights of the community; consequently the
drafters made room in the Charter for peoples' rights. 45
The concept was not new in a human rights document. For
example, Common Article 1 of the two basic international human
rights covenants makes peoples the subject of rights, a departure
from Western notions that human rights only attach to individu-
als. 146 There is recognition of the fact that individual rights cannot
be realized unless groups hold collective rights. As clearly noted
by Sohn:
One of the main characteristics of humanity is that human
beings are social creatures. Consequently, most individu-
als belong to various units, groups, and communities; they
are simultaneously members of such units as a family,
religious community, social club, trade union, professional
association, racial group, people, nation, and state. It is
not surprising, therefore, that international law not only
recognizes inalienable rights of individuals, but also rec-
ognizes certain collective rights that are exercised jointly
freedoms contained in the present Charter and to see to it that these freedoms
and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood.
African Charter, supra note 1, art. 25, 21 I.L.M. at 63.
144. Benedek observes further, that in traditional African societies "the human being
could not survive apart from his people, the community, who in turn was dependent on the
participation of all its constituent parts." Benedek, supra note 130, at 63. This relationship
was one of duality, "not one of subordination but of complementary, participation, and
dialogue." Id. The "support and allegiance" of these relationships "are still a predominant
factor of the life of most Africans." Id.
145. Rapporteur's Report, OAU Doc. CM11149 (XXXVII), Ann. 1, at 3, para. 10,
quoted in Kiwanuka, supra note 5, at 82.
146. Article 1 of both the ICESCR and ICCPR provides: "All peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." ICESCR, supra note 3,
art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 1 [hereinafter Common Article 1]. During the drafting of
the ICESCR and the ICCPR, Western governments stiffly opposed Common Article 1
because it put at risk the continued domination of the colonies.
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by individuals grouped into larger communities, including
peoples and nations. These rights are still human rights;
the effective exercise of collective rights is a precondition to
the exercise of other rights, political or economic or both.
If a community is not free, most of its members are also
deprived of many important rights.1'4 7
The African Charter distinguishes human rights from peoples' or
collective rights, but sees them in cooperation, not competition or
conflict. The Charter's preambular paragraph notes this relation-
ship and recognizes "on the one hand, that fundamental human
rights stem from the attributes of human beings, which justifies
their national and international protection and on the other hand,
that the reality and respect for peoples rights should necessarily
guarantee human rights."'14 This unambiguous statement, notes
van Boven, is conclusive proof of the Charter's view: human rights
are inalienable and intrinsic to man individuals and are not in con-
flict with peoples' rights, which they complement.149 The exercise
of sovereignty rights by a "people" or "peoples" as contemplated
by the Charter is a necessary precondition for the enjoyment of
individual rights.'50 This dialectic between individual and peoples'
rights is one of the bases for the Charter's imposition of duties on
individuals. Solidarity between the individual and the greater soci-
147. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1982) (emphasis added). See generally,
Kiwanuka, supra note 5.
148. African Charter, supra note 1, pmbl., 21 LLM. at 59.
149. van Boven, supra note 5, at 188-89. In its usage of "peoples," the African Charter
neither contemplates internal self-determination, the right of a people to overthrow an
oppressive, undemocratic, and illegitimate regime, nor the claims of a minority or group
within an independent state to its own self-determination or secession. Self-determination
in the context of the OAU without a doubt refers to situations of foreign, colonial-type
domination (previously the case in Namibia), or to minority-ruled regimes (formerly the
case in South Africa). Ethnic groups or communities within an independent state, such as
the Luo or Luhyia of Kenya, are not envisaged by the Charter in this regard. The
individual rights guaranteed in the Charter, particularly the rights to political participation,
speech, association, and assembly, imply the right of citizens to a rule of law, democratic
state.
150. Kiwanuka has identified at least four interpretations or usages of a "people" or
"peoples" in the Charter. They are: (i) all persons within the territorial limits of a colonial
state or minority-ruled regime; (ii) all groups of people with certain common
characteristics who live within a colonial territory or a minority-ruled state, or minorities
within an independent state (external self-determination would not be permitted under the
OAU in this case); (iii) the people and the state as interchangeable; and (iv) all persons
within the state. See generally Kiwanuka, supra note 5. These are the bearers of collective
rights against the state which it has the duty to realize.
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ety safeguards -collective rights, without which individual rights
would be unattainable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Today Africa is at a cross-roads. Since colonization, when
Europe restructured its political map, Africa has lunged from one
crisis to another. Whether it was famine consuming millions, Idi
Amin dispatching political opponents and innocents with impunity,
senseless coups by soldiers who could barely read, the recent
Rwandese carnage or ethnic tensions turned deadly, or corrupt
political elites, the list of abominations is simply unbearable. The
failure of the post-colonial state is so pervasive that it has become
the rule, not the exception. Needless to say, there are numerous
causes for this crisis, perhaps the most important of which is the
disfiguration of the continent's political identity by the imposition
of European forms and values of government and society. Narrow
political elites who barely comprehend the Western notions they
eagerly mimic-and who have lost the anchor in their past-
remain in power, but without a rudder.151 This crisis of cultural
identity is Africa's most serious enemy. But with the end of coloni-
zation and the cold war-the two driving reasons for past Euro-
pean and American interest in Africa-Africans should re-
examine the assumptions underlying the role and purpose of the
state and its organization.
This Article is not intended to dismiss concerns about the poten-
tial for the misuse of the duty/rights conception by political elites to
achieve narrow, personal ends. However, any notions are subject
to abuse by power-hungry elites. There is no basis for concluding
that the duty/rights conception is unique in this respect. While it is
true that the pre-colonial context in which the conception origi-
nally worked was small in scale and relatively uncomplicated, the
argument made here is not about magnitudes. Instead, the ideals
that can be distilled from the past are the central thrust of this
argument. Is it possible to introduce in the modern African state
grassroots democracy, deepening it in neighborhood communities
and villages in the tradition of the pre-colonial council of elders?
Can the family reclaim its status as the basic organizational polit-
151. See Michael Chege, Between Africa's Extremes, 6 J. Democracy 44, 45 (1995).
Chege notes the minimum conditions for the institutionalization of free and popular
government which include shared democratic principles, an engaged middles class, and
democratic leadership in a reasonably viable state. Id.
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ical unit in this re-democratization process? Is it possible to create
a state of laws-where elected officials are bound by checks and
balances-as in the days of the old where chiefs were held account-
able, at times through destooling? Can the state and the family
devise a "social security" system in which the burden of caring for
the aged and the needy can be shared? Is it possible to require
individuals to take responsibility for their actions in matters relat-
ing to sexuality, community security, and self-help projects in the
construction of community schools and health centers, utilizing
concepts such as harambee,152 the Kenyan slogan for puffing
together? Child care and rearing, including lighter forms of disci-
pline such as a reprimand, for example, have always been commu-
nity affairs in Africa.15 3  Could community-based programs be
devised and encouraged to promote the "village-raising" of chil-
dren? These are the typical questions that the new formulation of
human rights must ask in the context of recreating the African
state to legitimize human rights on the continent.
This Article represents a preliminary attempt to begin rethinking
Africa's pre-colonial articulation of human rights and propose how
some of the ideals imbedded in the past could be woven into con-
ceptions of man, society, and the state in a way that would make
the human rights corpus more relevant to Africa today. Senghor
stressed the need for an Afro-centric document which would
"assimilate without being assimilated," but also cautioned against
a charter for the "African Man" only: he emphasized that
"[m]ankind is one and indivisible and the basic needs of man are
152. Harambee has been used in contemporary Kenya as a philosophy to drive domestic
development groups. For an example, harambee self-help projects in rural communities
account for the construction of 70% of Kenya's secondary schools. David Gillies & Makau
wa Mutua, A Long Road to Uhuru: Human Rights and Political Participation in Kenya
(Report of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development,
Montreal, Canada), at 2 (1993). Harambee projects have been undertaken with little or no
state assistance. Conceived originally as "the social glue binding the state to society," it
forced the state to be "accountable in the realm of social services" because under
Kenyatta, the country's first president, it worked as "an extra-parliamentary bargaining
system" for elected politicians to negotiate alliances and attract additional private
resources to their constituencies. Id. It acted, in effect, as a redistributive mechanism
where the influential politician would assemble prosperous friends to make personal
monetary contributions or material to self-help projects. Id. However, as the state became
more repressive and the political elites more cynical, harambee was turned into a "forced
tax and an instrument of patronage" through which senior politicians would extort funds
from businesses or frighten away contributors for particular causes or institutions. Id. at 3;
see also Jennifer A. Widner, The Rise of a Party State in Kenya: From "Harambee!" to
"Nyayo!" (1992).
153. See Cobbah, supra note 41, at 322.
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similar everywhere.' 1 54 Part of the reason for the failure of the
post-colonial state to respect human rights lies in the seemingly
alien character of that corpus. The African Charter's duty/rights
conception is an excellent point of departure in the reconstruction
of a new ethos and the restoration of confidence in the continent's
cultural identity. It reintroduces values that Africa needs most at
this time: commitment, solidarity, respect, and responsibility.
Moreover, it also represents a recognition of another reality. Indi-
vidual rights are collective in their dimension. "[T]heir recogni-
tion, their mode of exercise and their means of protection" is a
collective process requiring the intervention of other individuals,
groups, and communities. 55 The past, as the Africans of the old
used to say, is part of the living. It ought to be used to construct a
better tomorrow.
154. See Kunig, supra note 72, at 122, 124 (quoting Senghor's speech) (emphasis
omitted).
155. Marie, supra note 5, at 199. This was the vision of pre-colonial societies.
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